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This paper estimates a sticky-price DSGE model with a ﬁnancial accelera-
tor to assess the importance of ﬁnancial frictions in the ampliﬁcation and
propagation of the eﬀects of transitory shocks. Structural parameters of two
models, one with and one without a ﬁnancial accelerator, are estimated using
a maximum-likelihood procedure and post-war US data. The estimation and
simulation results provide some quantitative evidence in favour of the ﬁnan-
cial accelerator model. The ﬁnancial accelerator appears to play an important
role in investment ﬂuctuations, but its importance for output depends on the
nature of the initial shock.
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An extensive literature has argued that credit market frictions can amplify and prop-
agate the eﬀects of aggregate shocks to the macroeconomy (for example Bernanke
and Gertler 1989, 1995 and Carlstrom and Fuerst 1997). Shocks have a larger or
more persistent aﬀect on macro variables because they aﬀect ﬁrm balance sheets,
changing the cost of borrowing over and above the traditional eﬀects on inter-
est rates. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist(1999) (BGG hereafter) introduce such
a credit market friction into a calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model with sticky prices. They argue that this friction leads to a ”ﬁnancial
accelerator” mechanism that improves the ability of an otherwise standard model
to explain normal cyclical ﬂuctuations.
If credit frictions are quantitatively important for cyclical ﬂuctuations, models
used for monetary policy analysis should take them more seriously. The focus of
this paper is to evaluate the importance of credit market frictions in amplifying
and propagating the eﬀects of transitory shocks on macroeconomic variables. To
this end, we develop and estimate a sticky-price DSGE model that includes a ﬁnan-
cial accelerator mechanism similar to that of BGG. The structural parameters of the
model, including those related to the ﬁnancial accelerator are estimated econometri-
cally using post-war U.S. macroeconomic data and a maximum-likelihood procedure
with a Kalman ﬁlter. To evaluate the importance of the accelerator we compare the
impulse responses of macro variables with and without the ﬁnancial accelerator
present. We also reestimate a constrained version of the model in which the ﬁnan-
cial accelerator is turned-oﬀ. Estimating these two versions of the model allows us
to econometrically test for the presence of a ﬁnanical acclerator mechanism.
We ﬁnd that the estimate of the parameter related to the ﬁnancial accelerator
1is statistically signiﬁcant and larger than in many calibrated studies. The impulse
response functions show that introducing the ﬁnancial accelerator helps to amplify
and propagate the eﬀects of all transitory shocks on investment. Its importance for
the ampliﬁcation of output ﬂuctuations varies depending on the nature of the shock
considered. The likelihood ratio test rejects the basic sticky price model without
the ﬁnancial accelerator in favour of the one that includes it.
1.1 Links to the literature
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) link the cost of a ﬁrms’ external ﬁnance to the quality
of their balance sheet.1 Entrepreneurs, who borrow funds to undertake investment
projects, face an external ﬁnance premium that rises as their personal stake in the
project (net worth) falls. Declines in net worth lead to tighter ﬁnancing conditions,
reducing the demand for capital. This sets oﬀ an “accelerator” eﬀect because the
value of the capital held by ﬁrms (net worth) declines as the demand for capital falls
resulting in a further rise in the cost of ﬁnancing.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) ﬁrst demonstrated the quantitative importance of
this mechanism. They inserted the same type of ﬁnancial friction in an otherwise
standard RBC model and found that it can reproduce the hump-shaped output re-
sponse to shocks (propagation) that is seen in the data, but does not amplify the
response of output. One drawback of their model is that it produces a procyclical
external ﬁnance premium which is at odds with the data. Using a sticky-price model
calibrated to post-war U.S. data, BGG show that a diﬀerent set up for the ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism both ampliﬁes the impact of shocks and provides a quanti-
1An alternative approach is to introduce ﬁnancial frictions by giving ﬁnancial intermediaries
an ability to change credit conditions without a change in borrower creditworthiness. Examples
of these studies are Cook (1999), Cooper and Ejarque (2000), Atta-Mensah and Dib (2003), and
Meh and Moran (2004).
2tatively important mechanism that propagates shocks at business cycle frequencies.
In addition, it generates a countercyclical risk premium.2
The literature on estimated DSGE models with ﬁnancial frictions is emerging.
Perhaps the closest to our study is Meier and Muller (2004) who consider the role of
the BGG-style ﬁnancial accelerator in the monetary transmission mechanism. They
estimate their model by matching model impulse responses with the empirical im-
pulse responses to a monetary policy shock from a VAR. Their ﬁndings attribute an
important role to capital adjustment costs, but only a minor role to the accelerator
in explaining the transmission of monetary policy shocks. We are interested not just
in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, but also the role of the accel-
erator in the ampliﬁcation and propagation of other shocks. Neri(2004) estimates
a DSGE model with a Carlstrom and Fuerst-style ﬁnancial friction using Bayesian
techniques. He ﬁnds that a model with both capital adjustment costs and this ﬁ-
nancial friction does better at explaining the data than either of these alone. Our
objectives are similar, but we use the BGG accelerator set up, in part because we
think the countercyclical risk premium is an attractive feature of that model. Chris-
tiano, Motto and Rostagno (2004) estimate a ﬁnancial accelerator model of the U.S.
during the Great Depression, but do not isolate its contribution to their ﬁndings.
Like the ﬁrst two studies, we consider only the post-war period in U.S. history and
therefore consider normal cyclical ﬂuctuations rather than ﬁnancial crises.
The model developed here is based on Dib (2002) and Ireland (2001,2003). It
2Subsequent work using the BGG model for other countries has found similar results (see Hall
(2001) for the UK and Fukunaga (2002) for Japan). A number of studies have used this ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism to account for macroeconomic developments at times of ﬁnancial crisis.
Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2004), Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003), Tovar (2003, 2004),
and Elekdag, Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2005) consider the case of open economies in emerging
markets. Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2004) use the ﬁnancial accelerator in their analysis of
the Great Depression in the U.S.
3has the basic sticky price set up as in BGG, allowing for comparison with both BGG
and with Ireland (2003). One important feature of the Ireland model is its emphasis
on the estimation of the parameter associated with capital adjustment costs. This
in important because the interaction of capital adjustment costs and sticky prices
is key in allowing sticky price models to match important features of the data. In
addition, in our context capital adjustment costs are pivotal in generating the asset
price ﬂuctuations that aﬀect ﬁrm balance sheets, a key mechanism of the ﬁnancial
accelerator.
These models also have the advantage that they use a general class of monetary
policy rule. This is useful because the behaviour of the monetary authorities has
an impact on the quantitative importance of the ﬁnancial accelerator. For example,
BGG have noted that policy rules that stabilize output will also counteract, and
may eliminate, the impact of the ﬁnancial accelerator on output or investment (see
Fukunaga (2002) for an example).3 Also, to best capture the behaviour of the
monetary authories in post-war data we need to use a rule that is general enough
to allow for what is widely believed to be a fundamental change in Federal Reserve
policy that appeared in mid-1979, ex. Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (2000). For now
we present results based on the model estimated using data since 1979. 4
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
describes the data and the econometric method used to estimate the models. Section
4 discusses the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
3Its eﬀects may, nonetheless, show up elsewhere such as the size of the monetary policy response
required to dampen output ﬂuctuations.
4However, we plan to estimate the model for the 1959Q1 to 1979Q2 period separately as in
Ireland (2003), which would allow the monetary policy parameters to change.
42 The Model
Our basic model is a closed economy DSGE model similar to Dib (2002) and Ire-
land(2001,2003). The key addition to this model is a ﬁnancial accelerator mecha-
nism similar to that proposed by BGG. As a result, we assume that the economy
is characterized by three types of rigidities: price stickyness, capital adjustment
costs, and ﬁnancial market frictions. We also assume the economy is disturbed by
ﬁve transitory shocks: technology, money demand, monetary policy, preference, and
investment eﬃciency shocks.
In this model there are three types of producers: entrepreneurs; capital pro-
ducers; and retailers. Entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods. They borrow
from a ﬁnancial intermediary that converts household deposits into business ﬁnanc-
ing for the purchase of capital. The presence of asymmetric information between
entrepreneurs and lenders creates a ﬁnancial friction which makes entrepreneurial
demand for capital depend on their ﬁnancial position. Capital producers build new
capital and sell it to entrepreneurs. Changes in the supply of or demand for capital
will lead the price of capital to ﬂuctuate and further propagate the shocks. Retailers
set nominal prices in a staggered fashion ` a la Calvo (1983). This nominal rigidity
gives monetary policy a role in this model. Our model diﬀers from BGG in its char-
acterization of monetary policy by a modiﬁed Taylor-type rule. We assume that the
Federal Reserve manages short-term interest rates in response to inﬂation, output,
and money growth changes. In addition, we allow for the possibility of debt deﬂation
and a utility function that is non-separable in consumption and real balances.
52.1 Households
The representative household derives utility from consumption, ct; real money bal-







where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, Mt is holdings of nominal money balances,
ht is labour supply, and pt is the consumer price level. The single-period utility



















+ η log(1 − ht), (2)
where γ > 0 and η > 0 denote the constant elasticity of substitution between
consumption and real balances, and the weight on leisure in the utility function,
respectively. We interpret zt as a taste (preference) shock, while bt is interpreted as
a money demand shock. These shocks follow ﬁrst-order autoregressive processes:
log(zt) = ρz log(zt−1) + εzt, (3)
and
log(bt) = (1 − ρb)log(b) + ρb log(bt−1) + εbt, (4)
where ρz,ρb ∈ (−1,1) are autoregressive coeﬃcients, b is constant, and the seri-
ally uncorrelated shocks εzt and εbt are normally distributed with zero means and
standard deviations σz and σb, respectively.
The representative household enters period t with dt−1 units of real deposits in
the ﬁnancial intermediary; nominal money balances, Mt−1; and nominal bonds, Bt−1.
6While deposits, dt, at the ﬁnancial intermediary pay interest, money balances, Mt,
are money held outside of banks (cash) or low interest bearing savings instruments
such as chequing accounts.5 The inclusion of money balances is motivated, in part,
by empirical evidence that money demand shocks matter for business cycles. During
period t the household chooses to consume, ct; purchase new government bonds, Bt;
change money balances Mt
pt ; deposit funds at the ﬁnancial intermediary, dt; and work











ht + dt−1 +
Mt−1 + Bt−1 + Tt + Dt
pt
, (5)
























































where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint; mt =
Mt/pt, wt = Wt/pt, πt+1 = pt+1/pt.
5The real return on bonds and deposits is the same in equilibrium. We introduce nominal
(bonds) and real (deposits) assets to explicity derive the Fisher equation.
72.2 Production sector
2.2.1 Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneurs’ behaviour folloes that proposed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999). Entrepreneurs manage ﬁrms that produce wholesale goods and borrow to
ﬁnance the capital used in the production process. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral
and have a ﬁnite expected horizon for planning purposes. The probability that an
entrepreneur will survive until the next period is ν, so the expected lifetime horizon
is 1/(1 − ν). This assumption ensures that entrepreneurs’ net worth (the ﬁrm eq-
uity) will never be enough to fully ﬁnance the new capital acquisition. In essence,
they issue debt contracts to ﬁnance their desired investment expenditures in excess
of net worth.
At the end of each period, entrepreneurs purchase capital that will be used in
the next period, qtkt+1. The capital acquisition is ﬁnanced partly by their net worth
nt+1 and by borrowing qtkt+1−nt+1 from a ﬁnancial intermediary. This intermediary
obtains its funds from household deposits and faces an opportunity cost of funds
equal to the economy’s riskless rate of return, Rn
t .
The entrepreneurs’ demand for capital depends on the expected marginal return
and the expected marginal external ﬁnancing cost. Consequently,
Etft+1 = Et
·




where ft+1 is the interest rate on external (borrowed) funds and and rkt+1 is the
marginal productivity of capital at t + 1. Following BGG (1999), we assume the
existence of an agency problem that makes external ﬁnance more expensive than
internal funds. The entrepreneurs costlessly observe their output which is subject to
a random outcome. The ﬁnancial intermediaries incur an auditing cost to observe an
8entrepreneur’s output. After observing his project outcome, an entrepreneur decides
whether to repay his debt or to default. If he defaults the ﬁnancial intermediary
audits the loan and recovers the project outcome less monitoring costs.
Accordingly, the marginal external ﬁnancing cost is equal to a gross premium
for external funds plus the gross real opportunity costs equivalent to the riskless
interest rate. Thus, the demand for capital should satisfy the following optimality
condition:
Etft+1 = Et [S(·)Rt], (12)
where EtRt = Et (Rn







with S0(·) < 0 and S(1) = 1.
The gross external ﬁnance premium S(·) depends on the size of the borrower’s eq-
uity stake in project (or alternatively the borrower’s leverage ratio). As nt+1/qtkt+1
falls, the borrower relies on uncollateralized borrowing (higher leverage) to a larger
extent to fund his project. Since this increases the incentive to misreport the out-
come of the project the loan becomes riskier and the cost of borrowing rises.6
Aggregate entrepreneurial net worth evolves according to
nt+1 = νvt + (1 − ν)gt, (14)
where vt denotes the net worth of surviving entrepreneurs net of borrowing costs
carried over from the previous period. 1 − ν is the share of new entrepreneurs
entering the economy and gt is the transfer or ”seed money” that newly entering
6Note that when the riskiness of loans increases the agency costs rise and the lender’s expected
loses increase. A higher external ﬁnance premium paid by successful entrepreneurs oﬀsets these
higher loses and ensures that there is no change to the return on deposits for households.
9entrepreneurs receive from entrepreneurs that die and depart from the scene. vt is
given by
vt = [ftqt−1kt − Et−1ft(qt−1kt − nt)] (15)
where ft is the ex post real return on capital held in t, and Et−1ft is the ex post
cost of borrowing. Earnings from operations this period become next period’s net
worth.
To produce output yt, the entrepreneurs use kt units of capital and ht units of




1−α , α ∈ (0,1), (16)
where At is a technology shock that is common to all entrepreneurs. The technology
shock At is assumed to follow the autoregressive process
logAt = (1 − ρA)log(A) + ρA log(At−1) + εAt, (17)
where ρa (-1,1), A > 0, and ²At is normally distributed with zero mean and standard
deviation σA.

















where ξt > 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the technology function,
and ξt/λt is the real marginal cost, MCt/pt.7
7We assume that entrepreneurial consumption is small and it drops out of the model.
102.2.2 Capital producers
Capital producers use a linear technology to produce capital goods, kt, sold at the
end of period t. They also use a fraction of ﬁnal goods purchased from retailers.
The produced capital goods replace depreciated capital and add to the capital stock.
We assume that capital producers are subject to quadratic capital adjustment costs.
















Thus, the optimal condition is
Et
·







which is the standard Tobin’s Q equation that relates the price of capital to the
marginal adjustment costs.
The quantity and price of capital are determined in the market for capital. The
entrepreneurial demand curve for capital is determined by equations (11) and (18)
and the supply of capital is given by equation (22). The intersection of these curves
gives the quantity and price of capital. Capital adjustment costs slow down the
response of investment to diﬀerent shocks, which directly aﬀects the price of capital.
Furthermore, the aggregate capital stock evolves according to
kt+1 = xtit + (1 − δ)kt. (23)
where δ is the depreciation rate and the disturbance xt is a shock to the marginal
eﬃciency of investment (as in Greenwood et al. (1998)). The xt shock follows the
autoregressive process:
log(xt) = ρx log(xt−1) + εxt, (24)
11where ρ is normally distributed with standard deviation σx.
2.2.3 Retailers
The retailers purchase the wholesale goods at a price equal to nominal marginal
costs MCt and diﬀerentiate them at no cost.8 They then sell these diﬀerentiated
retail goods on a monopolistically competitive market. Following Calvo (1983), we
assume that retailers cannot change their selling prices unless they receive a random
signal. The constant probability of receiving such a signal is (1 − φ). Thus, each
retailer j sets the price ¯ pt(j) that maximizes the expected proﬁt for l periods. 9 The


















where the retailer’s proﬁt function is
Dt+l(j) = (¯ pt(j) − MCt+l)yt+l(j). (27)
8The retail sector is used only to introduce nominal rigidity into this economy.
9l is the average length of time a price remains unchanged, l = 1/(1 − φ).
10This demand function is derived from the deﬁnition of aggregate demand as the composite
of individual ﬁnal output (retail) goods and the corresponding price index in the monopolistic















where yt+l(j) and pt+l(j) are the demand and price faced by each individual retailer j ∈ (0,1)
















t−1 + (1 − φ)¯ p
1−θ
t . (29)
These equations lead to the following New Keynesian Phillips curve
Etˆ πt+1 = ˆ πt −
(1 − βφ)(1 − φ)
φ
ˆ mct (30)
where mct is real marginal cost and variables with hats are log deviations from the
steady state value (ˆ xt = log(xt/x)).
2.3 Monetary authority
Following Ireland (2004), the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate, Rn
t ,
in response to deviations of inﬂation, πt = pt/pt−1, output, yt, and money growth





n) = %π log(πt/π) + %y log(yt/y) + %µ log(µt/µ) + εRt (31)
where Rn, π, y, and µ are the steady-state values of Rn
t , πt, yt, and µt, respectively;
εRt is a monetary policy shock normally distributed with zero mean and standard
deviation σR. The newly created money is transfered to households, so Tt = Mt −
Mt−1. By reacting to money growth deviations, the central bank tries to insulate
the economy from the eﬀects of money demand shocks.
13We choose this policy rule to provide more ﬂexibility in the characterization of
monetary policy than the rule in BGG, which contains only the interest rate smooth-
ing term and the lagged deviation of inﬂation from its steady state.11 Allowing for a
stronger output stabilizing response of monetary policy may have an impact on the
conclusions regarding the importance of the ﬁnancial accelerator. Also, we plan to
estimate the model over the 1959-1979 period, so this ﬂexibility will help to better
characterize any change in Federal Reserve behaviour. For example, if %µ is non-
zero, monetary policy can be considered to inﬂuence a linear combination of the
interest rate and money growth to achieve a target for inﬂation.
2.4 Symmetric equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium, all entrepreneurs are identical, so they make the same
decision. In this economy, the symmetric equilibrium consists of an allocation
{yt,ct,mt,it,ht,kt,nt} and a sequence of prices and co-state variables {wt,rkt,Rn
t ,Rt,
ft,qt,λt,mct} that satisfy the optimality conditions of households, capital producers,
entrepreneurs, and retailers; the money-supply rule; and the stochastic processes for
preferences, money demand, productivity, investment and monetary policy shocks
(see Appendix A).
Taking a log-linear approximation of the equilibrium system around steady-state
values and using Blanchard and Kahn’s (1980) procedure yields a state-space solu-
tion of the form:
ˆ st+1 = Φ1ˆ st + Φ2εt+1, (32)
ˆ dt = Φ3ˆ st. (33)
The state variable vector, ˆ st, includes predetermined and exogenous variables; ˆ dt is
11In addition, they set the weight on inﬂation deviations equal to 0.11.
14the vector of control variables; and the vector εt contains the random innovations.
The coeﬃcient matrices, Φ1,Φ2, and Φ3, have elements that depend on the structural
parameters of the model. Therefore, the state-space solution, (34)–(35), is used to
estimate and simulate the model.
3 Calibration and Data
As in previous studies that estimate DSGE models using a maximum-likelihood
procedure, some parameters have to be set prior to estimation because the data
used contain little information about them. Thus, the parameter η, denoting the
weight on leisure in the utility function, is set equal to 1.315, so that the household
spends around 33 per cent of its time in market activities. The degree of retailers’
monopoly power, θ, is set equal to 6, which implies a gross steady-state price markup
of 1.20. The depreciation rate, δ, is assigned the commonly used values of 0.025.
The constant associated with money demand,b, is set to 0.07.12
We also calibrate some of the parameters related to the credit market friction.
We ﬁx the steady state interest rate on external funds equal to the average of the
business prime loan rate over our sample (this gives a gross external ﬁnance premium,
S(·), of about 1.03 or 3.0 per cent per year on a net basis). We set the steady state
debt-to-asset (leverage) ratio equal to 2 and the probability that an entrepreneur
will survive for the next period, ν, to 0.9728, as in BGG (1999).13
The remaining non-calibrated parameters are estimated using a maximum-likelihood
procedure with a Kalman ﬁlter. This method applies a Kalman ﬁlter to a model’s
state-space form to generate series of innovations used to evaluate the likelihood
12This parameter was diﬃcult to estimate.
13Therefore, on the average, an entrepreneur may live 36 years.
15function for the sample. Because the solution is a state-space econometric model,
driven by ﬁve innovations in εt, the structural parameters embedded in Φ1, Φ2, and
Φ3 can be estimated by a maximum-likelihood procedure using data for ﬁve series,
in this case yt, it,πt, Rt and mt.14
Using quarterly US data from 1979Q3 through 2004Q3, we estimate two versions
of the model. The ﬁrst is a model with a ﬁnancial accelerator (hereafter referred
to as the FA model). The second is the same model with the dynamic eﬀects of
the ﬁnancial accelerator turned oﬀ. In this model the parameter that captures
the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium with respect to ﬁrm leverage ψ is
constrained to equal zero.15 We call this the Estimated No-FA Model.
Output is measured by real GDP excluding government expenditures, since there
is no government spending in the model. Ireland(2003) argues that investment data
is required because using only output data is insuﬃcient to identify the capital ad-
justment cost parameter. Investment is real expenditures on machinery and equip-
ment and non-residential construction. Real balances are measured by dividing the
base money stock by the GDP deﬂator. These two series are expressed in per capita
terms using the civilian population aged 16 and over. The inﬂation rate is measured
by changes in the GDP implicit price deﬂator, while the short-term nominal inter-
est rate is measured by the rate on three-month treasury bills. All the series are
HP-ﬁltered before the estimation.16
14This method is decribed in Hamilton (1994, Chap. 13)
15See the linearized equations in Appendix C.
16Inﬂation and interest rates exhibit a small downward trend over the post-1979 sample.
164 Empirical Results
4.1 Parameter estimates
Table 1 reports the maximum-likelihood estimates and standard errors of the FA and
Estimated No-FA model’s structural parameters for the 1979Q3 to 2004Q3 period.
The estimates of γ, the constant elasticity of substitution between consumption
and real balances, is 0.026 and the estimate of the capital share in the production
function, α, is close to 0.33.
The capital adjustment cost parameter, χ, is 1.43 in the FA model more than
double the 0.64 estimated in the the Estimated No-FA model. These estimates are
considerably higher than the 0.25 value for the adjustment cost parameter used by
BGG. However, using a similar econometric methodology, Ireland (2001,2003) ﬁnds
estimates of the adjustment cost parameter that are much larger.17 The estimates
of φ, the probability that prices remain unchanged for the next period, is about
0.5 in both models. This indicates that ﬁrms set prices for about 2 quarters on
average.18 Thus prices are quite ﬂexible compared to other estimated DSGE models
with Calvo pricing. The estimates of all the monetary policy rule parameters are
statistically diﬀerent from zero. The policy rule in the FA model responds more
aggressively to inﬂation, output and money growth deviations. The estimate of %π,
the coeﬃcient that measures the response of monetary policy to inﬂation deviations
is 1.94 in the FA model, but much less, 0.91, in the No-FA model. The estimates of
%y are small, but statistically signiﬁcant and take the expected sign in both models.
The estimated value of %µ, the weight on money growth deviations, is 0.41 in the
17The estimated value for χ in Ireland (2003) 32.1 in the post-1979 sample.
18Prices are somewhat stickier in BGG with φ = 0.75 implying and average period between price
adjustments of 4 quarters.
17FA model, but a much smaller 0.15 in the No-FA model.In both models, estimates
of the policy rule parameters indicate that since 1979 the Fed has responded much
more strongly to inﬂation deviations than to output or money growth ﬂuctuations.
The estimate of the parameter ψ, the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium
with respect to ﬁrm leverage, is statistically signiﬁcant and equal to 0.092. This
estimate is higher than values usually used to calibrate this parameter in models
with a ﬁnancial accelerator. For example, Bernanke and Gertler (2000) set ψ to
0.05 about half of our estimated value. This value is sometimes calibrated with an
eye to matching historical averages over much of the post-war period of the spread
between the prime business loan rate and the risk-free rate and the ratio of business
debt to assets. The diﬀerence in values of ψ may be due to using data that span
much more of the post-war period than we use for estimation.
Do the dynamic eﬀects associated with ﬂuctuations in net worth and the risk
premium allow the FA model to better capture the comovement in the data? We use
the likelihood-ratio test to test the restriction imposed by the No-FA model (ψ = 0)
against the model with the ﬁnancial accelerator (FA model). Let Lu and Lc denote
the maximum values of the log-likelihood function for the unconstrained (FA) and
constrained (No-FA) models, respectively. The likelihood ratio statistic −2(Lc−Lu)
has a chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis
that the No-FA is valid. The value of Lu is 1896.8 and Lc is 1871.4 giving a test
statistic of 50.8. The 2 per cent critical value for a χ2(2) is 9.21. Therefore, the
likelihood ratio test easily rejects the restrictions of the No-FA model in favour of
the model that includes a ﬁnancial accelerator.19
19Note that this is not an empirical test for the existence of a ﬁnancial frictions since one must
exist in both models because the steady state cost of external funds exceeds the risk-free rate.
This is a test of the extent to which such a friction improves the models ability to account for the
dynamics of macrovariables seen in the data
184.2 Impulse responses
Next we compare the responses of various macroeconomic variables to ﬁve diﬀerent
shocks when the ﬁnancial accelerator is present and when it is not. Figures 1 to 5
display the impulse responses to a 1 per cent shock to the short-term nominal interest
rate (tightening of monetary policy), technology (increase in At), money demand
(increase in bt), preferences for consumption (increase in zt) and the eﬃciency of
investment (increase in xt). Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage
deviation from its steady-state level, except rates which are in percentage points
(e.g. a 0.1 increase in ˆ Rn
t is an increase of 10 basis points).
In ﬁgures 1 to 5 the impulse responses generated in the estimated FA model are
shown in red. The dashed lines (in blue) are impulse responses when the dynamic
eﬀects of the ﬁnancial accelerator are not present. They are the impulse responses
generated by setting ψ equal to 0, but keeping all of the other parameter estimates
from the FA model (we call this the No-FA model). The diﬀerence between the red
and blue lines should indicate the impact of the accelerator mechanism on a given
variable after a particular shock. Since the likelihood-ratio test rejects the estimated
model in which ψ is constrained to equal zero, its impulse responses are not shown
here.
Figure 1 shows that the presence of a ﬁnancial accelerator both ampliﬁes and
propagates the impact of a positive 1 per cent monetary policy shock on real vari-
ables, particularly for investment. Despite the fact that the shock only lasts for
one period, deviations of investment, output and hours are long-lived. The basic
mechanism of the ﬁnancial accelerator is evident in the impulse responses. After a
tightening in monetary policy, net worth falls because of the declining return to cap-
ital and the higher real interest costs associated with existing debt (debt-deﬂation
19eﬀect). The external ﬁnance premium rises reﬂecting the increase in ﬁrm leverage.
The higher funding cost of purchasing new capital depresses the demand for new
capital and the expected price of capital persists below its steady state value.
Figure 2 shows that following a 1 per cent positive technology shock there is an
important ampliﬁcation of investment but no ampliﬁcation of the output response
when the ﬁnancial accelerator is present. Again the impact on output, investment
and hours lingers in the FA model responses. Here the technology shock increases
the return to capital pushing up net worth. The small decline in inﬂation that
results from the shock increases the real cost of repaying existing debt, dampening
the rise of net worth slightly. The positive impact on net worth from the higher
return to capital dominates, in part due to the endogenous policy response that
reduces the disinﬂationary impact, and net worth rises. Higher net worth decreases
the external ﬁnance premium and increases the demand for capital. Again the
response of investment to the shock is much larger when the FA is present. As
is often found in sticky-price models, hours worked declines after the technology
shock as the wealth eﬀect from higher marginal product of labour outweighs the
substitution eﬀect. However, the decline in hours worked is not very diﬀerent in the
FA and No-FA cases. The model estimated with no ﬁnancial accelerator shows a
more persistent response of output, but this is due to a higher estimated persistence
coeﬃcient of technology shock.
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses to a positive 1 per cent money-demand
shock. As the demand for real balances rises, consumption and savings falls de-
pressing output and investment. In addition, with less output being produced, but
more liquidity in the economy expected inﬂation rises. The monetary authority re-
sponds with higher interest rates and an increased supply of money since the interest
20elasticity of money demand is small. In the FA model the initial drop in the re-
turn to capital has a larger impact on output and investment due to the accelerator
eﬀects.
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to a positive 1 per cent shock to the
marginal utility of consumption and real balances. The presence of a ﬁnancial ac-
celerator dampens the impact of the shock slightly from the the No-FA case. This is
due to its inﬂuence on investment, which declines more sharply when the accelerator
is present (consumption is almost identical in the two cases). The preference shock
initially raises the marginal utility of consumption and therefore the opportunity
cost of holding deposits (savings). As households divert deposits toward consump-
tion the return on deposits (the risk free real interest rate) rises. In the accelerator
model the rise in this interest rate has an larger eﬀect on investment due to the
impact on ﬁrms’ net worth.
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses to an investment eﬃciency shock. This is
a persistent positive shock to the marginal eﬃciency with which investment goods
are turned into capital. Impulse responses from the FA model show that after such
a shock investment drops sharply, but the capital stock increases. This is possible
because the higher marginal eﬃciency of investment is a perfect substitute for invest-
ment and more than compensates for its decline. Investment falls because future
marginal product of capital declines and capital adjustment costs increase as the
capital stock rises. In the FA model the decline in investment is more pronounced.
The rise in the supply of capital reduces its price and lowers the return on capital and
hence net worth. The resulting rise in the external ﬁnance premium makes the cost
of funding investment purchases even higher. The fact that a positive productivity
shock to investment causes an increase in the risk premium may be particular to the
21form of capital adjustment costs in the model. We plan to consider and alternative
form of adjustment cost in the future.
As in previous studies, the FA ampliﬁes and propagates the impact of the shocks
on investment. The importance of the FA for output ﬂuctuations, however, depends
on the shock. For the monetary policy, money demand and investment eﬃciency
shocks the initial impact on output is double (or more) when the FA is present.
However, the FA has no impact on the initial response of output after a technology
shock though the eﬀects are more persistent. In the case of the shock to the marginal
utility of consumption output actually responds less when the FA is present.
4.3 Volatility and autocorrelation
Table 3 reports the volatilities of output, investment, money growth (µt), interest
rates and inﬂation from the data and for simulated versions of the FA model with the
accelerator active and with it turned oﬀ.20 The standard deviations are expressed
in percentage terms. In the data, investment is about 5 times as volative as output,
the standard deviation of output is 1.04 and investment is 5.6. Money growth has
a standard deviation of 0.85 percent . The short-term nominal interest rate and
inﬂation are less volatile; their standard deviations are 0.31 per cent and 0.21 per
cent, respectively.
The simulation results show that output volatility in the FA model when the
accelerator is active is close to the volatility of output in the data. However, the
model in which the accelerator is inactive overpredicts output volatility to a large
degree. This is a feature common to sticky-price models. It is interesting that
the FA model which contains an extra friction meant to amplify and propagate
20In the data, all series are HP-ﬁltered before calculating their standard deviations.
22shocks shows less output volatility. All of the models overpredict the volatility of
investment, but not the ratio of investment volatility to output volatility. In the FA
model, investment is almost 9 times as volatile as output compared with about 5
times in the data. In the model with the FA inactive, investment is not even twice as
volatile as output. Both versions of the model do well at replicating the volatility of
money growth and overpredict the volatility of nominal interest rates. Both models
also generates inﬂation volatility higher than that seen in the data.
Figure 6 plots the autocorrelation functions for output, investment, money, nom-
inal interest rates and inﬂation generated by our models and in the data. The model
with the active FA mechanism model does a better job at matching the autocor-
relations seen in the data. It does a good job of matching the autocorrelation in
inﬂation and nominal interest rate within a 4 quarter horizon. However, output and
investment in the FA model are still much more highly autocorrelated than are the
data.
4.4 Variance decompositions
Tables 4 and 5 decompose the forecast-error variance of detrended output and in-
ﬂation owing to technology, money demand, monetary policy, preference and in-
vestment eﬃciency shocks. Again, results are shown for the FA model with the
accelerator is active and when it it turned oﬀ. Table 2 decomposes the forecast-
error variance of detrended output. As shown in Panel A, the FA model implies
that technology, preference and investment shocks explain almost all of the out-
put ﬂuctuations in both the near and the long term. Surprisingly, monetary policy
shocks play a role in output ﬂuctuations in the long run. In contrast, Panel B
shows that, in the model with the FA shut oﬀ, preference shocks and aggregate
23technology shocks are most important for output ﬂuctuations at short horizons, ac-
counting for 52 per cent and 40 per cent (respectively) of the variance in output at
the one-quarter-ahead horizon. Investment shocks account for 95 per cent of output
ﬂuctuations at a 50 quarter horizon.
Table 5 decomposes the forecast-error variance of inﬂation. Panel A shows that
all of the shocks play a role in short-run inﬂation ﬂuctuations in the FA model.
Money demand shocks are most important in the long-run, accounting for 32 per cent
of inﬂation ﬂuctuations. In the model with the FA shut oﬀ, technology and monetary
policy shocks account for most of the short-term ﬂuctuation in inﬂation. Monetary
policy shocks account for about 43 per cent of the one-step-ahead inﬂation forecast-
error variance. While these shocks are also important for long-run ﬂuctuations in
inﬂation, investment shocks play a relatively more important role.
5 Conclusion
There is a growing literature focusing on the importance of ﬁnancial frictions in the
ampliﬁcation and propagation of transitory shocks in the context of DSGE models.
In this paper, we introduce the ﬁnancial accelerator ` a la Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999) into a standard sticky-price model to econometrically assess the
role of the ﬁnancial accelerator in post-war US business cycles.
Using quarterly data and a maximum-likelihood procedure with a Kalman ﬁl-
ter, we estimate two versions of the model, one with and one without the ﬁnancial
accelerator. Estimated values of the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium with
respect to the leverage ratio are statistically signiﬁcant and higher than often as-
sumed in calibrated studies. A likelihood ratio test rejects the model without a
ﬁnancial accelerator in favour of the one with it. The impulse response functions
24show that introducing the ﬁnancial accelerator helps to amplify and propagate the
eﬀects of all transitory shocks on investment. Its importance for the ampliﬁcation
of output ﬂuctuations varies depending on the nature of the shock considered.
Future work wish to explore estimating the underlying parameters of the ﬁnancial
contract rather than taking the reduced form approach employed here. We could
also extend this model to include further real frictions, more sources of persistence,
and some exogenous ﬁnancial shocks. This might allow the model to better match
the empirical responses of macroeconomic variables to diﬀerent shocks. We may
also extend this work to analyze the role of the ﬁnancial accelerator in a small open
economy model.
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28Table 1: Maximum-likelihood estimates: 1979Q3 to 2004Q3
FA Model No-FA Model
Parameters Estimates Std. errors Estimates Std. errors
ψ 0.0922 0.0102 - -
α 0.3412 0.0382 0.3234 0.0390
γ 0.0267 0.0048 0.0195 0.0034
χ 1.4264 0.5809 0.6428 0.3719
φ 0.4939 0.0091 0.4816 0.0731
%π 1.9440 0.2616 0.9141 0.0425
%y 0.0836 0.0256 0.0466 0.0188
%µ 0.4157 0.0502 0.1518 0.0320
σR 0.0050 0.0007 0.0033 0.0003
ρA 0.7599 0.0623 0.8502 0.0869
σA 0.0060 0.0008 0.0033 0.0007
ρb 0.6177 0.0531 0.8351 0.0623
σb 0.0101 0.0004 0.0085 0.0008
ρz 0.6684 0.0597 0.9565 0.0148
σz 0.0086 0.0008 0.0137 0.0017
ρx 0.8877 0.0364 0.9798 0.0251
σx 0.0841 0.0147 0.1207 0.0318
LL 1896.8 1871.4
29Table 3: Standard deviations: data and models
Variables Data FA Model FA Model, ψ = 0
y 1.04 1.22 4.85
i 5.61 10.78 8.54
µt 0.85 0.87 0.91
Rn
t 0.31 0.42 0.43
πt 0.21 0.28 0.39
Table 4: Forecast-error variance decomposition of detrended output
Percentage owing to:
Quarters Variance Technology Money demand Policy Preference Investment
A. FA Model
1 0.0036 26.38 4.43 6.70 26.34 36.14
2 0.0056 31.24 3.26 4.99 23.57 36.95
4 0.0075 35.19 2.53 4.27 20.16 37.85
10 0.0087 38.38 2.22 5.19 17.60 36.60
50 0.0121 34.32 1.73 12.33 14.21 37.41
B. FA Model with FA shut oﬀ
1 0.0023 40.55 2.29 3.89 52.54 0.73
2 0.0035 47.67 1.47 2.61 47.59 0.65
4 0.0049 50.20 1.07 1.88 40.12 6.73
10 0.0111 26.20 0.47 0.83 18.33 54.16
50 0.1083 2.74 0.05 0.09 1.89 95.23
30Table 5: Forecast-error variance decomposition of inﬂation
Percentage owing to:
Quarters Variance Technology Money demand Policy Preference Investment
A. FA Model
1 0.0004 11.38 13.89 27.13 32.75 14.85
2 0.0006 8.22 27.40 21.07 30.57 12.74
4 0.0007 7.36 34.01 17.65 28.78 12.19
10 0.0007 7.15 33.94 16.59 27.81 14.51
50 0.0008 7.04 32.12 16.12 26.41 18.31
B. FA Model with FA shut oﬀ
1 0.0005 40.55 5.06 42.91 9.69 1.79
2 0.0005 39.54 6.91 40.74 11.13 1.68
4 0.0006 37.94 9.97 38.66 11.70 1.72
10 0.0006 36.28 10.23 36.85 11.42 5.22
50 0.0010 21.95 6.18 22.28 6.91 42.67
31Figure 1: Monetary policy shock
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32Figure 2: Technology shock
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33Figure 3: Money demand shock
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34Figure 4: Preference shock
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35Figure 5: Investment eﬃciency shock
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Etnt+1 = ν [ftqt−1kt − Et−1ft(qt−1kt − nt)] + (1 − ν)gt; (A.14)
kt+1 = xtit + (1 − δ)kt; (A.15)

























µt = mtπt/mt−1. (A.18)
38B. The steady-state equilibrium
µ = π = 1; (B.1)






n = 1/β; (B.4)
f = rk + 1 − δ; (B.5)
f = S(·)R; (B.6)


















































39C. The log-linearized equilibrium system
Static equations




ˆ bt + (γ − 1) ˆ mt
´
− γˆ zt; (C.1)





hˆ ht/(1 − h) − ˆ wt = ˆ λt; (C.3)
ˆ yt = ˆ At + αˆ kt + (1 − α)ˆ ht; (C.4)
yˆ yt = cˆ ct + iˆ it; (C.5)
ˆ wt = ˆ yt + ˆ mct − ˆ ht; (C.6)
ˆ rkt = ˆ yt + ˆ mct − ˆ kt; (C.7)
ˆ µt = ˆ mt − ˆ mt−1 + ˆ πt (C.8)
ˆ R
n
t = %R ˆ Rn
t−1 + %πˆ πt + %µˆ µt + %yˆ yt + εRt; (C.9)







ˆ qt = χ(ˆ it − ˆ kt). (C.11)
40Dynamic equations
βˆ πt+1 = ˆ πt −
(1 − βφ)(1 − φ)
φ
ˆ mct; (C.12)
ˆ λt+1 = ˆ λt − ˆ Rt; (C.13)
ˆ πt+1 = ˆ R
n
t − ˆ Rt; (C.14)
ˆ kt+1 = δˆ it + δˆ xt + (1 − δ)ˆ kt; (C.15)




























− 1) + 1
¶
ˆ nt. (C.17)
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